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NOTES 
UCC-SECURED TRANSACTIONS-JUDICIAL SALES 
-Purchaser at Judicial Sale Takes Property 
Subject to Unperfected Security Interest 
of Which He Has Knowledge 
In two recent cases, courts have considered the question whether 
or not a purchaser at a judicial sale takes property free of an un-
perfected security interest of which he has knowledge. Although 
they used different theories, both courts concluded that the holder 
of the unperfected security interest had priority over the purchaser 
with knowledge. Bloom v. Hilty1 (Bloom) was an action to replevy 
a quantity of pipe which the plaintiff, Bloom, had sold to Hilty 
pursuant to a title-retention contract. Bloom's security interest, 
obtained by virtue of his retention of title,2 was unperfected. After 
the sale by Bloom, Cardwell Drilling Co. (Cardwell) sold Hilty a 
drilling rig and equipment, taking a chattel mortgage on the pipe 
as well as on the drilling equipment. Cardwell filed financing state-
ments in order to perfect its security interest.3 Pursuant to a judg-
ment for a third party, Hilty's drilling equipment and pipe were 
levied upon and sold at an execution sale. Cardwell purchased the 
goods at the sale, and Bloom brought suit against both Cardwell 
and Hilty. The trial court gave judgment for Bloom but the su-
perior court reversed.4 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated 
both judgments and remanded the case to the trial court. 5 The 
court held that Cardwell prevailed over Bloom to the extent of its 
perfected security interest by reason of section 9-312(5)(b) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which provides that "priority 
between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be 
determined ... in the order ,of perfection." However, according to 
l. 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860 (1967), rev'g 210 Pa. Super. 255 (1967), rev'g 48 WEST-
MORELAND COUNTY L.J. 251 (C.P. 1966) (en bane). 
2. Under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2·401 [hereinafter UCC], a reservation by 
the seller of title to goods delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of 
a security interest. 
3. Pennsylvania requires filing in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
and, if the debtor has a place of business in only one county in the state, in the office 
of the prothonotary of the county where his business is located. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, 
§ 9-40l(l)(c) (1954), UCC § 9-40l(l)(c) [third alternative subsection (l)]. 
4. The trial court treated Cardwell not as a secured party but as a lien creditor 
with knowledge of Bloom's unperfected security interest. Since UCC § 9-30l(l)(b) 
subordinates unperfected security interests only to lien creditors without knowledge, 
the court held that Cardwell took subject to Bloom's interest. 427 Pa. at 466, 234 A.2d 
at 861. The superior court did not dispute the trial court's finding that Cardwell was 
a lien creditor but reversed on the ground that there was no evidence to show that 
Cardwell had knowledge of Bloom's security interest. 427 Pa. at 467, 234 A.2d at 861. 
5. The supreme court held that Cardwell was not a lien creditor. 427 Pa. at 470, 
234 A.2d at 863. 
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the court, if the value of the equipment should be found to exceed 
Cardwell's perfected security interest, the priority of interests in 
the excess as between Bloom's unperfected security interest and 
Cardwell's interest as a purchaser at the sale would turn on whether 
or not Cardwell had actual knowledge of Bloom's interest at the 
time of the execution sale.6 The court stated that if Cardwell pur-
chased without actual knowledge, it took free of Bloom's interest 
by reason of section 9-30l(l)(c) of the UCC,7 which provides that 
"a person who is not a secured party and who is a ... buyer not in 
the ordinary course of business" takes free of an unperfected se-
curity interest "to the extent that he gives value and receives 
delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest 
and before it is perfected .... "8 Although the opinion does not 
specify what the result was to be if Cardwell had knowledge of 
Bloom's interest, the court apparently felt that in such a situation 
the negative implication of section 9-30l(l)(c) would require that 
Bloom, the holder of the unperfected security interest, prevail.9 
In re Dennis Mitchell Industries, lnc.10 (Mitchell) was a pro-
ceeding in bankruptcy in which Herman Schwabe, Inc. (Schwabe), 
sought to reclaim two hydraulic cutting machines that it had sold 
to Dennis Mitchell Industries, Inc. (Mitchell), pursuant to a con-
ditional sales contract. More than a year before the bankruptcy 
proceeding, Schwabe, relying on a contract provision requiring that 
the machines be kept in Philadelphia, and apparently unaware 
that they had never been in Pennsylvania,11 had filed financing 
6. The supreme court directed the trial court to determine whether or not the 
value of the equipment exceeded Cardwell's interest, and, if so, whether or not Cardwell 
had actual knowledge of Bloom's interest. 427 Pa. at 469, 234 A.2d at 863. It further 
found some evidence from which Cardwell's knowledge at the time of the sale might 
have been inferred although the trial court had not made a specific finding on the 
issue of knowledge. 427 Pa. at 468-69, 234 A.2d at 862. 
7. 427 Pa. at 468 n.1, 234 A.2d at 863 n.1. 
8. § 9-301(1): 
[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of 
(c) in the case of goods •.• a person who is not a secured party and who is 
a ... buyer not in ordinary course of business to the extent that he gives value 
and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest 
and before it is perfected • . •. 
9. Although the court did not deal with this possibility specifically, it felt that 
section 9-301(1)(c) was the crucial provision; and a lack of knowledge of the security 
interest is one of the conditions necessary for the operation of that provision. Thus, if 
there is knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that the result would be the opposite 
from that provided for in 9-30l(l)(c). 
10. 280 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1968), afj'g 4 UCC REP. SERv. 1084 (Ref. E.D. Pa. 
1967). But on June 19, 1969, while this Note was in the final stages of printing, the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court. In re Dennis 
Mitchell Indus., Inc., No. 17,240 (3d Cir., filed June 19, 1969). 
11. Mitchell took delivery of the machines in New York and transported them on 
its own truck to its plant in New Jersey where they were permanently installed. Brief 
for Appellant, at 23a, In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., rev'd, No. 17,240 (3d Cir., 
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statements there in accordance with the Pennsylvania UCC.12 When 
Mitchell was adjudicated bankrupt, Schwabe filed its petition for 
reclamation. While action on this petition was pending, the referee 
authorized the receivers to sell the bankrupt's unliquidated assets 
to a nominee of A. J. Armstrong Co. (Armstrong).13 The nominee 
contested the reclamation petition, arguing that Schwabe's security 
interest was unperfected since Schwabe had not filed in the state 
where the machines were located, 14 and that Armstrong had suc-
ceeded to the trustee's priority over unperfected security interests 
by virtue of the "shelter provision" in section 2-403(1) of the UCC. 
That provision grants a purchaser of goods "all title which his trans-
feror had or had power to transfer."15 The referee rejected this 
argument and granted Schwabe's petition; the district court af-
firmed. Despite the fact that Schwabe had not filed in the state 
where the machines were located, the court held that Schwabe's 
security interest was perfected.16 An alternative holding was that 
filed June 19, 1969). Schwabe contends that it did not receive notice that the 
machinery had been installed in New Jersey rather than in Pennsylvania until the 
receiver-trustee filed his answer to the petition for reclamation. Brief for Appellee, at 
3, In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., appeal docketed, No. 17,240, 3d Cir., June 10, 1968. 
12. See note 3, supra. 
13. A bankruptcy court may sell whatever interest the bankrupt estate has, leaving 
the purchaser and the claimant to contest their rights to the property elsewhere 
[Schmidt v. Ryon, 281 F. 790, 793 (3d Cir. 1922)], or it may sell the assets free of 
liens, leaving the claimant to contest the distribution of the proceeds [4A Vv. COLLIER, 
BANKRuPTCY ,r 70.99, at 1214, 1217-19 (14th ed. 1967)]. In Mitchell, the court sold the 
assets subject to liens and claims, but also decided the rights of the claimants in the 
assets. 280 F. Supp. at 435. 
14. According to UCC section 9-102, comment 3, filing in the state in which the 
collateral is located is necessary to perfect a security interest. See note 22 infra. 
15. Brief for A.J. Armstrong at 4, In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 4 UCC REP. 
SERv. 1084 (Ref. E.D. Pa. 1967); Brief for Appellant at 3 In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., 
Inc., 280 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
16. 280 F. Supp. at 436. This holding is clearly erroneous. Under the UCC, applicable 
in all jurisdictions involved, the proper place to file financing statements is the state 
in which collateral is located. See UCC § 9-102, comment 3. Since the goods here were 
never in Pennsylvania, filing there was ineffective to perfect Schwabe's security interest. 
See UCC § 9-102(1), comment 3. The court reached the opposite result by treating the 
cutting machines as "mobile goods"-"goods normally used in more than one jurisdic-
tion"-in which a security interest is perfected by filing in the state in which the 
debtor has his principal place of business. UCC § 9-103(2). This exception assumes that 
the transitional nature of goods such as automotive equipment, rolling stock, and 
airplanes [UCC § 9-103(2)] will put third parties on notice that different filing rules 
apply and will thus justify relieving the secured party of an otherwise onerous filing 
burden. Factory equipment such as that involved in Mitchell would not fulfill this 
notice function, and the exception should therefore not apply. 
The court of appeals, in reversing the district court, held that Schwabe's security 
interest was unperfected and that the trustee's status as a lien creditor enabled him 
to sell the machines free of that unperfected interest. In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., 
Inc., No. 17,240 (3d Cir., filed June 19, 1969), at 17. 
The referee has based his conclusion that the interest was perfected on the relation-
back provision of section 9-103(3). 4 UCC REP. SERv. 1084, 1086 (Ref. E.D. Pa. 1967). 
This ground is likewise insufficient. First, the draftsmen clearly intended to cut off 
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Armstrong would take subject to Schwabe's security interest even 
if it was unperfected because it had knowledge of that interest.17 
Although the court conc1uded that Armstrong's rights were gov-
erned by article 9, which deals with secured transactions, rather 
than by section 2-403(1),18 as Armstrong had urged, it did not base 
its holding on any specific provision in article 9.19 Instead, it seemed 
to rely upon the law relating to judicial sales, which it interpreted 
as protecting a purchaser from only those outstanding interests of 
which he had no actual or constructive notice.20 
The first question for consideration is the applicability of the 
"shelter provision" of section 2-403(1)21 to these cases. This section 
may be relied upon by different parties depending upon the nature 
of the sale. When a bankruptcy sale is involved, the buyer may 
claim, as Armstrong did in Mitchell, that the section allows him to 
succeed to the trustee's priority over unperfected security interests.22 
relation back after four months. UCC § 9-103, comment 7. More fundamentally, the 
relation-back provision presupposes that the security interest was perfected in the 
state in which the collateral was located when the security interest attached. UCC 8e 
9-103(3). Since a security interest attaches when there is agreement, giving of value, 
and passage of rights in the collateral to the debtor [UCC § 9-204(1)], the state of 
attachment here was New York, not Pennsylvania. 
17. 280 F. Supp. at 435. The court of appeals, however, held that Armstrong, as a 
purchaser from the trustee, took title to the machines free of Schwabe's unperfected 
security interest, whether or not he could be charged with knowledge or notice of 
such security interest. In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., No. 17,240 (3d Cir., filed 
June 19, 1969), at 17. 
18. 280 F. Supp. at 436. 
19. It may be that the court referred to article 9 only to dispose of section 2-403. 
20. 280 F. Supp. at 436. However, the court should have applied bankruptcy law 
under which Armstrong would succeed to the trustee's priority over unperfected 
security interests. See notes 22 and 36 infra. Indeed, the court of appeals, in reversing 
the district court, did apply bankruptcy law and so held. In re Dennis Mitchell 
Indus., Inc., No. 17,240 (3d Cir., filed June 19, 1969), at 17. 
21. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Under Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 11 
U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1964), trustees in bankruptcy acquire by operation of law title to all 
nonexempt property which the bankrupt might have transferred as of the date of 
bankruptcy. Moreover, trustees have the status of lien creditors without knowledge 
under Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § llO(c) (Supp. III, 1965-1967): The trustee shall 
have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of: (I) a creditor who obtained 
a judgment against the bankrupt upon the date of bankruptcy, whether or not such 
a creditor exists, (2) a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained an execution 
returned unsatisfied against the bankrupt, whether or not such a creditor exists, and 
(3) a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable 
proceedings upon all property, whether or not coming into possession or control of 
the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt upon a simple contract could have 
obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists. There is some early 
authority that when the trustee has actual knowledge of unrecorded liens, he gets no 
greater rights under § 70c than a lien creditor with such knowledge. E.g., In re Golden 
Cruller 8e Doughnut Co., 6 F.2d 1015 (DN.J. 1925), American Laundry Mach. Co. v. 
Everybody's Laundry, 185 Iowa 760, 171 N.W. 161 (1919). The UCC explicitly avoids 
this result but apparently would deprive the trustee of his innocent status at least 
when he and all creditors had knowledge of the security interest. See UCC § 9-301(3). 
The better view, however, seems to be that the trustee is without knowledge as a 
matter of law. 
22. 4A w. CoLUER, supra note 13, at 1[ 70.53; 2 G. GII.MORE, SECURITY INTERESTS 
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When an ordinary judicial sale is involved, however, there is no 
intermediate transferee with both title to the property and a clear 
claim to priority, and the secured party may rely on this section 
to assert that the buyer takes no greater rights than his debtor had 
or had power to transfer and that thus the buyer takes subject to 
the unperfected security interest. 
In either situation it appears that the Mitchell court's holding 
that this section does not apply is correct. The draftsmen intended 
article 9 to be a comprehensive treatment of security interests23 and 
therefore placed in that article exclusive rules for determining 
priority benveen transferees of a debtor and a secured party when 
the debtor makes disposition of the collateral which is unauthorized 
by the security agreement.24 If, as the courts in both Bloom and 
Mitchell assumed,25 the UCC applies to judicial sales,26 article 9 
should also control priority benveen secured parties and purchasers 
at such sales, to the exclusion of other provisions of the UCC. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that section 2-403(1) speaks 
solely in terms of passage of title,27 while section 9-202 declares 
that technicalities of title are immaterial to the rights of parties 
to secured transactions. 
If section 2-403(1) is not applicable, it is important to deter-
mine what sections are controlling. Initially, both section 9-306(2) 
and section 9-30l(l)(c)28 appear relevant. Section 9-306(2) provides 
that "a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding 
sale, exchange, or other disposition thereof .... "; thus, it seems to 
allow the holder of the unperfected security interest to prevail. 
However, section 9-306(2) is limited by the clause "[e]xcept where 
this Article otherwise provides," and comment 3 to that section in-
dicates that the provisions of section 9-30 l determine when a trans-
feree takes free of an unperfected security interest. Of the 9-301 
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.3.2, at 1295-96; Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform 
Commercial Code on Insolvency, 67 COM. L.J. 113, 115 (1962); Kennedy, The Trustee 
in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code; Some Problems Suggested by 
Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 518, 522-25 (1960); see In re Horton, 31 F. 2d 795, 
799 (W.D. La. 1928). 
2!1. UCC § 2-40!1: "The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are 
governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9) .•.. " 
While comment 4 to § 2-403 seems to indicate that subsection (1), the "shelter" 
provision, is excepted from the operation of subsection (4), the language of subsection 
(4) could hardly be more clear that the rights of purchasers other than those expressly 
covered in § 2-403 are to be determined by articles other than article 2-in this case, 
article 9. Moreover, even if the "shelter" provision is excepted from subsection (4), it 
deals only with title, which is not relevant to rights of the parties arising from 
security interests. See text accompanying note 30 infra. 
24. See UCC section 9-306(2). 
25. See text accompanying notes 5-9 and 16-22 supra. 
26. But see text accompanying notes 32-34 infra. 
27. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
28. See text accompanying notes 8 and 9 supra. 
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provisions, only subsection (l)(c) speaks to the situation at hand,29 
for it applies to buyers who take neither as secured parties nor in 
the ordinary course of business, 30 and buyers at judicial sales meet 
both of these conditions. Accordingly, the Bloom court might seem 
correct in concluding that section 9-301(1)(c) required, by its nega-
tive implication, that the secured party have priority.31 
A closer reading of the UCC and the draftsmen's commentary, 
however, leads to the conclusion that the priority benveen pur-
chasers of goods at judicial sales and holders of unperfected security 
interests in those goods is not governed by section 9-301(1)(c) or 
any other provision of the UCC. Comment 6 to section 9-501 states 
that a judicial sale "is governed by other law and not by this 
Article .... "32 This statement is directed specifically at the judicial 
sale held to satisfy a judgment obtained by a secured party.33 A 
fortiori the exclusion of UCC coverage should apply when the 
sale satisfies a judgment obtained by an unsecured party. Section 
9-306(2), which provides for the continuation of a security interest 
in collateral "notwithstanding sale, exchange, or other disposition 
thereof by the debtor ... " is, of course, no bar to this conclusion 
if the usual rule is accepted that it is the court, not the debtor, that 
makes the disposition at a judicial sale.34 
Therefore, since article 9 does not apply to judicial sales, the 
priority between purchasers of goods at such sales and holders of 
unperfected security interests in those goods is determined by the 
pre-existing law governing judicial sales. Under the pre-existing 
law, it seems clear that the purchaser at a judicial sale takes free 
of outstanding interests not enforceable against the intervening lien 
29. Subsection (l)(a) applies only to the situation in which both security interests 
are perfected and to that in which neither interest is perfected; subsection (l)(b) 
applies only to lien creditors; and subsection (l)(d) applies only to accounts, contract 
rights, and general intangibles. Subsection (2) provides for the relation back of perfec-
tion of a purchase-money security interest, and subsection (3) defines "lien creditor." 
30. A "buyer in the ordinary course of business" is one who, besides meeting other 
tests, buys from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. UCC § 1-201(9). 
By negative implication, all other buyers are "buyers not in the ordinary course of 
business." Clearly, a buyer at a judicial sale is not buying from one in the business of 
selling goods of that kind and, thus, is a buyer "not in the ordinary course of business." 
31. See notes 8 and 9 supra and accompanying text. 
32. UCC § 9-501, comment 6. Professor Hogan believes that UCC § 9-501(5), which 
provides that "the secured party may purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the 
collateral free of any other requirements of this Article," indicates that the UCC does 
not govern judicial sales. He suggests that by freeing the secured party of the most 
stringent requirements of article 9, this section implies that the UCC does not apply at 
all to judicial sales. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the 
UCC, 47 MINN L. REv. 205, 251-52 (1962). 
33. The judgment obtained is a remedy available to a secured party upon the 
debtor's default. It may be enforced by judicial sale pursuant to a levy of execution 
against the collateral. UCC §§ 9-501(1), 9-501(5). 
34. See, e.g. Calhoun v. Commercial Credit Corp., 151 Pa. Super, 589, 591, 30 A.2d 
735, 736 (1943). 
May 1969] Notes 1427 
creditor at the time his lien attached.35 This is also true of bank-
ruptcy sales.36 Thus, it is necessary to determine what interests are 
not enforceable against the lien creditor. As between lien creditors 
and secured parties article 9 does apply. Section 9-301(1)(b) gives 
priority over an unperfected security interest to "a person who 
becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest 
and before it is perfected." Again, section 9-306(2) should not bar 
this conclusion since that section is limited by the phrase "[e]xcept 
where this Article otherwise provides,"37 and since the commentary 
indicates that one of the sections referred to by this phrase is section 
9-301.38 Thus, taking sections 9-30l(l)(b) and 9-306(2) together, 
one can conclude that an unperfected security interest simply dis-
continues when a person without notice becomes a lien creditor. 
Given this conclusion and the general law of judicial sales, a sub-
sequent purchaser-even one with knowledge of the unperfected 
security interest-takes free of that interest. 
This result is not inevitable, of course; it might be argued that 
under such circumstances the unperfected security interest discon-
tinues only with respect to the lien creditor, and not with respect 
to the purchaser at a judicial sale, especially when the purchaser 
35. Teaford v. Moss, 235 Ala. 490, 491, 179 S. 817, 818 (1938); Doyle v. Wade, 23 
Fla. 90, 96, l S. 516, 519-20 (1887); Shay v. Security Bank, 67 Minn. 287, 69 N.W. 920 
(1897); Black v. Mullins &: Co., 86 N.J.L. 463, 92 A. 281 (1914); Miners Sav. Bank v. 
Tracy, 326 Pa. 367, 372, 192 A. 246, 249 (1937), appeal dismissed sub nom. Toole v. 
Miners Sav. Bank, 302 U.S. 651 (1937); Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S.C. 264, 270-71, 84 
S.E. 233, 235 (1914); Note, Execution Sales-Rights of Bona Fide Purchasers, 24 MINN. 
L. REv. 805, 807, 829 (1940). 
36. Unless specifically ordered to be free of liens, a bankruptcy sale is made subject 
to "valid" liens and encumbrances, and the interests of the lienholders are not affected 
by the sale. Gotkin v. Korn, 182 F.2d 380, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (purchaser at a bank-
ruptcy sale took subject to recorded lien); 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 13, ,r 70.98 at 
1199. However, the purchaser at the sale should take free of security interests which are 
unperfected at the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed. In GMAC v. Raz Delivery, 
Inc., 238 App. Div. 277, 264 N.Y. Supp. 412 (1933), noted, 18 MINN. L. REv. 586 (1934), 
the plaintiff sought to assert its rights under a conditional sales contract which had not 
been filed prior to the vendee's bankruptcy. Since the trustee's rights as a lien creditor 
without knowledge (see note 22 supra) were superior to rights arising under an unfiled 
conditional sales contract, the court held that the intervention of the trustee's rights 
reduced the creditor's claim to an unsecured claim against the bankrupt estate (238 
App. Div. at 279-80, 264 N.Y. Supp. at 414-15). Since an unperfected security interest is 
clearly subordinate to the rights of the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy [UCC 
§§ 9-301(l)(b), 9-301(3)], it should likewise be reduced to an unsecured claim as of the 
date of bankruptcy when the trustee's rights as a lien creditor without knowledge 
accrue [UCC § 9-301(3); Bankruptcy Act § 70c, supra note 22]. Consequently, a subse-
quent sale of the collateral should be free of the unperfected security interest; cf. 4A 
W. COLLIER, supra note 13, ,r 70.98, at 1199. Thus, if the court in Mitchell had applied 
bankruptcy law, as it should have, the purchaser, Armstrong, should have been held 
to have succeeded to the trustee's priority and thus to take free of the unperfected 
security interest. See In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., No. 17,240 (3d Cir., filed 
June 19, 1969), at 15-17. 
37. See text preceeding note 29 supra. 
38. UCC section 9-306, comment 3. 
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has knowledge of that interest. Such an interpretation would not be 
inconsistent with a literal reading of section 9-30l(l)(b), but as a 
practical matter it would subvert the priorities established in that 
section. If section 9-30l(l)(c) is applied to defeat the rights of pur-
chasers at judicial sales, the rights of lien creditors are also in-
directly defeated or diminished because potential purchasers will 
not buy (or will not pay full value for) goods subject to a possible 
unperfected security interest. Even if a potential purchaser is un-
aware of the existence of an unperfected security interest, his 
enthusiasm to buy will be lessened39 by the realization that one 
may exist and may have been perfected after the attachment of the 
lien, or by the realization that he may have to prove his ignorance 
of its existence to defeat the claims of a party who has been provi-
dent enough to advertise his unperfected security interest in local 
newspapers. The result would be that the lien creditor, thought 
to be secure under the coverage of section 9-30l(l)(b), has lost at 
least part of the only benefit that his lien confers under the cir-
cumstances-the proceeds of the judicial sale. 
These arguments indicate that a purchaser at a judicial sale 
ought to take free of all unperfected security interests, even if he 
has knowledge of them; and notwithstanding the Bloom and 
Mitchell decisions,40 this appears to be the result reached in most 
cases dealing with this problem. In Mitchell, for example, the court 
relied on an earlier Pennsylvania case in which the purchaser was 
also the judgment creditor and appeared to have had knowledge 
at all relevant times of a prior assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors under which the plaintiff claimed title.41 However, the current 
validity of this precedent is dubious. To the extent that the case 
relied upon in Mitchell stands for the proposition that a purchaser 
at a judicial sale must rest his claim to priority on ignorance of 
earlier interests, it has been implicitly overruled by a later Penn-
sylvania case.42 The general rule that a purchaser at a judicial sale 
39. It is already true that a majority of judicial sales do not produce enough 
revenue to cover even the value of the debt which the goods secured. 2 G. GILMORl!!, 
supra note 22, § 43.2 at 1188 (1965); J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 295, at 348 (1956). 
40. S1:e 427 Pa. at 471, 234 A.2d at 864; and 280 F. Supp. at 436. But see In re 
Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., No. 17,240 (3d Cir., filed June 19, 1969), at 15-17. 
41. In Follweiler v. Lutz, 102 Pa. 585 (1883), the court seemed to rely on the fact 
that the purchaser had actual knowledge at the date of the sheriff's sale. The purchaser, 
however, was the lien creditor who had obtained his lien only one month before the 
sale. The short time between attachment and sale may have indicated that the lien 
creditor had actual knowledge at the time of attachment. Moreover, the purchaser• 
creditor appears to have been a relative of the debtor, which suggests that he had 
knowledge at all relevant times. 
42. Miners Sav. Bank v. Tracy, 326 Pa. 367, 192 A. 246 (1937), appeal dismissed sub 
nom. Toole v. Miners Sav. Bank, 302 U.S. 651 (1937), in which a judgment creditor 
who purchased at an execution sale took free of an unrecorded deed of which he had 
no knowledge on the date the judgment lien attached despite the notice of the deed 
which was given at the ~ale, 
May 1969] Notes 1429 
takes free of interests not enforceable against the lien creditor at 
the time his lien attached43 seems to encompass situations like those 
in Bloom and Mitchell in which the interest involved was an un-
perfected security interest.44 
Thus, both the Bloom and Mitchell courts should have applied 
the rule that the intervention of a lien creditor without knowledge 
subordinates unperfected security interests in the collateral. Unlike 
the rule apparently set out in section 9-30l(l)(c), this rule will 
prevent a secured party from defeating the lien creditor's priority 
under section 9-30I(l)(b) by filing after the creditor obtained his 
lien or by advertising his security interest at the judicial sale. By 
reducing the risks faced by purchasers at judicial sales, the rule 
will also advance the important policy of maximizing the proceeds 
of judicial sales.45 
43. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
44. The same result is true in bankruptcy law in which the purchaser succeeds to 
the trustee's priority over unperfected security interests. See note 36 supra. 
45. See text accompanying note 39 supra. This policy is manifest in the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Act. Under § 70c, II U.S.C. § IIOc (Supp. III, 1965-1967), the trustee 
acquires, as of the date of bankruptcy, the rights of a judgment creditor, an execution 
creditor, and a lien creditor, whether or not any of such creditors exist. See note 22, 
supra. With these rights the trustee obtains priority over lesser interests under state 
law. See, e.g., UCC § 9-30l(l)(b). Moreover, section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. 
§ l lO(e) (1964), gives the trustee the power to void transfers fraudulent or voidable as 
against any creditor having a provable claim under the Act. Finally, Bankruptcy Act 
§ 60, II U.S.C. § 96 (1964), and Bankruptcy Act§ 67, II U.S.C. § 107 (1964), as amended, 
II U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. Ill, 1965-1967), give the trustee additional power to void nrious 
preferences, liens, and fraudulent transfers. 
